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Abstract 
EPC Class-1 Generation-2 specification(Gen2 in brief) has been accepted as the standard for RFID tags under grant 
number ISO18000-6C. However, Gen2 does not pay due attention to security. For this reason, a Gen2 based security 
authentication protocol is developed in this paper. In details, we study the security requirements presented in the 
current Gen2 based RFID authentication protocols[7-13]. Then we point out the security flaws of Chien’s mutual 
authentication protocol[7], and improve the protocol based on a 11 security requirements. Our improved protocol 
merely uses CRC and PRNG operations supported by Gen2 and meets the 11 security requirements. In contrast to the 
similar work [14-15] on Chien’s protocol or other Gen2 based schemes, our protocol is more secure and our security 
analysis is much more comprehensive and qualitative.  
 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1. Introduction  
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are used to identify remote objects equipped with 
RFID tags by wireless scanning without manual intervention. To promote the adoption of RFID 
technology and to support interoperability, EPCglobal proposed one of the most important standards 
EPCglobal Class-1 Gen2 RFID specification (Gen2 in brief) [1]. Unfortunately, Duc [2] has pointed out 
that Gen2 is inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping under wireless communication environment. In order 
to prevent RFID tags from leaking message, three classes of schemes have been proposed: physical 
schemes, provable security schemes and practical Gen2 based schemes.  
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of ICAPIE Organization 
Committee. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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Physical schemes, such as tag killing, Faraday cage, active jamming and blocker tag, etc.[3], are too 
expensive to large-scale use in practice [3]. The provable security schemes  [4-5] are not applicable for 
Gen2 tags, because encryption functions and hash function are not supported by Gen2 although Yksel[6] 
presented a novel Hash solution with around 1.7K gates, it doesn’t pass the strict security analysis until 
now. Practical Gen2 based schemes[7-13] that just use lightweight algorithms supported by Gen2, such as 
bitwise operations, CRC operation, or PRNG operation did not well meet the security requirements 
shown in TABLE I. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II, we give a short review of Chien’s protocol [7] 
and then point out its drawbacks. In Section III, we improve Chien’s protocol to meet the security 
requirements and compare it with Gen2 based RFID protocols [7-13]. Finally, we conclude the paper in 
section IV. 
2. Chien’s Protocol and Security Analysis 
In this Section, we analyze Chien’s protocol[7] and take the analysis as a preparation for designing 
protocol. 
2.1 Chien’s Protocol 
In Chien’s Protocol, the server randomly selects an initial authentication key Kx_0 and initial access key 
Px_0. Tagx initially shares three values (EPCx, Kx_0, Px_0) with sever S, where EPCx is the EPC code of the 
tag. Kx_0 and Px_0 will be updated to  Kx_i and  Px_i after i-th successful authentication. S stores (Knew, Pnew, 
Kold, Pold, EPCx, DATA) , where Kold  and Pold  are the most recent ‘old’ values of Knew  and Pnew. Initially, 
Kold, Knew and Pnew, Pold both are set to Kx_0, Px_0, respectively.  
Chien’s protocol has four passes shown in Figure1. The detailed scenarios are described as follows: 
1) R→  Tagx: N1, where N1 is a random nonce.  
Tagx: Compute M1=CRC(EPCx || N1|| N2) ⊕ Kx_i, where N2 is a random nonce. 
2) Tagx →R: M1 , N2    R→S: M1, N2, N1 
      S: Search all (Knew, Kold，EPCx) and compute Iold = M1⊕ Kold，Inew = M1⊕ Knew, then verify the 
tag by checking whether Inew or Iold = CRC(EPCx || N1|| N2) holds. 
3) S→R: M2, DATA 
S: Compute M2=CRC(EPCx||N2)⊕Pnew or M2= CRC(EPCx ||N2)⊕Pold depending on which value (Knew 
or Kold) satisfies the verification equation in the previous step. Then update : Kold ←  Knew，Pold←  
Pnew，Knew ←  PRNG(Knew)，Pnew ←  PRNG(Pnew). 
4) R→  Tagx: M2 
Verify S by checking whether M2⊕  Px_i =CRC(EPCx || N2) holds. If satisfies, update Kx_i ←  
PRNG(Kx_i)，Px_i ←  PRNG(Px_i). 
ReaderServer Tag
4. M2
For each (Knew, Kold, EPCx), compute
 Inew=M1⊕ Knew, Iold=M1⊕  Kold
Verify  Inew or Iold=?CRC(EPCx||N1||N2 )
1.N1
2.M1, N2M1, N2, N1
3.M2, DATA
Compute
M2=CRC(EPCx||N2)⊕ Pnew(or Pold)
update Kold, Knew, Pold, Pnew
Generate N2, and compute
M1=CRC(EPCx||N1||N2)⊕ Kx_i
Verify  M2⊕ Px_i=?CRC(EPCx||N2)
If succeeds, update
             Kx_i, Px_i to Kx_i+1 ,Px_i+1
 
Figure 1. Chien’s protocol 
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2.2 Security Analysis 
To clearly express our contribution to security analysis, the following part is arranged as follows: the 
attacks that have been analyzed in [14-15] are briefly shown first in Proposition 1~3, and then the details 
of the new four attacks we find is shown in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5.
Proposition 1. Tag Forgery Resistance is not guaranteed due to the linearity of CRC and the plaintext 
N2 . 
Proof: The exchanged plaintext M1 can be obtained by an attacker. By using the lemma of CRC[14]: 
CRC(A||B)=CRC(Ax<<n⊕B)=CRC(Ax<<n)⊕CRC(B)     (1) 
and M1, the attacker gets Eq.(2): 
CRC(EPCx<<2l ) ⊕Kx_i= M1⊕CRC(Nx<<l) ⊕CRC(N2)    (2) 
Since he knows value of CRC(EPCx<<2l ) ⊕ Kx_i using N1, N2, CRC(N1<<l) and CRC(N2). Therefore, 
the attacker can pre-compute the value M1* before the next successful authentication as follows:  
M1*=CRC(EPCx || N1|| N2*)⊕Kx_i. 
Then S will be spoofed successfully when verifying. Hence the protocol does not guarantee Tag 
Forgery Resistance. 
Proposition 2. The linearity of CRC makes Tag Anonymity of Chien’s protocol not guaranteed. 
Proof: Form Proposition 1, we know an attacker can obtain the value of CRC(EPCx<<2l)⊕Kx_i. Note 
that, before the next updating, the value of CRC(EPCx<<2l) ⊕Kx_i is a constant for the attacker, that is, the 
message M1  can be transformed into a constant and could be tracked by the attacker. As a result, user 
location is revealed. Therefore, Anonymity is not guaranteed.  
Proposition 3. Chien’s protocol doesn’t achieve Forward Security and Resist to DoS attack. 
Proof: From two consecutive sessions eavesdropped, the attacker can obtain the following four values 
like that in [14]: 
M1i =CRC(EPCx || N1i || N2i) ⊕Kx_i                     (3) 
M2i =CRC(EPCx || N2i) ⊕ Px_i                              (4) 
M1(i+1) =CRC(EPCx || N1(i+1) || N2(i+1)) ⊕ Kx_i+1   (5) 
M2(i+1) =CRC(EPCx || N2(i+1)) ⊕ Px_i+1                 (6) 
By using Eq.(1), the attacker obtains Eq.(7) by (3)⊕(5): 
Kx_i ⊕Kx_i+1 = M1i ⊕M1(i+1) ⊕CRC(N1i || N2i)⊕              
CRC(N1(i+1)|| N2(i+1))  (7) 
Since the M1i , M1(i+1), N1i, N2i, N1(i+1) and N2(i+1) are plaintext, the value of Kx_i ⊕ Kx_i+1 would be 
revealed by Eq.(7). Then the length l of Kx_i is revealed. 
The value of Ks can be obtained by PRNG(K)=K⊕C where C is a constant. The attacker could check 
which Ks is right by trying an authentication in the (i+3)-th session. In this case，at least, Kx_i satisfies. 
Thus, we may regard that Kx_i is revealed. Now, From the knowledge of Kx_i, Eq.(3) and Eq.(5), the 
attacker could obtain CRC(EPCx<<2l). Likewise, he obtains Px_i and CRC(EPCx<<l) from Eq.(4) and Eq.(6).
Due to the random two consecutive sessions and the knowledge of Kx_i and Px_i, the attacker could 
know the following sessions that have been transmitted. Thus Forward Security is not guaranteed. 
Tag Forgery Resistance is not guaranteed as follows: By using Kx_i+1=PRNG(Kx_i), the attacker 
calculates Kx_j  ( j≥ i+1). And then he can pre-compute the value M1k* when receiving a new N1’ in the 
(k+1)-th (k≥ i+3) session as follows: 
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M1k*=CRC(EPCx || N1’|| N2k*)⊕ Kx_k  
and tag-to-reader authentication can be performed successfully.  
DoS attack happens as follows: If the above attack happens twice or more, the secrets between server 
and tag will be out of synchronization. They will never authenticate each other. 
Proposition 4. Chien’s protocol has no Privacy, Data Confidentiality, and Server Forgery Resistance. 
Proof: From two consecutive sessions shown in Proposition 3, an attacker gets the values of Kx_i and 
Px_i, and then could get EPCx from  CRC(EPCx<<l)= C' (where 'C  is a constant). Then the attacker checks 
which EPCx is genuine by trying an authentication in the (i+3)-th session. So we regard EPCx is revealed. 
Thus, Privacy is not achieved. 
By using Px_i+1 =PRNG(Px_i), the attacker calculates Px_k  (k≥ i+3). Then he can pre-compute the value 
M2k* in (k+1)-th session as follows:  
M2k*=CRC(EPCx || N2k) ⊕ Px_k. 
Then reader-to-tag authentication will be performed successfully. Hence, Server Forgery Resistance is 
not met. 
Furthermore, this attack will make authentication key and access key update illegally. A portion of the 
tag’s memory is rewritten, as a result, Data Confidentiality is not guaranteed. 
Proposition 5. Backward Security is not guaranteed in Chien’s protocol. 
Proof: If an attacker obtains EPCx, Kx_i and Px_i, he will obtain Kx_j  and Px_j (j ≥ i) by using 
Kx_i+1=PRNG(Kx_i) and Px_i+1=PRNG(Px_i). Thus, the messages transmitted in the (j+1)-th session can be 
decrypted. Therefore, the protocol does not achieve Backward Security. 
3. Improved Protocol and SECURITY Analysis 
To solve the problem in Section II, in this section we present an improved version, and then a 
comprehensive security analysis is given. 
3.1 The Improved Protocol 
The plaintext N2 in message 2 is transmitted which causes M1 to be tracked and other security 
problems. Thus, in the improved protocol it is encrypted. Meanwhile, M1 is re-encrypted by Ki. To 
enhance the Backward Security, the nonce N2 is used in the update stage. The details of the improved 
protocol is as follows. 
1) R→  Tagx: N1, where N1 is a random nonce. 
Tagx: Compute M1= N2⊕Kx_i，M2=CRC(Kx_i ||EPCx || N1|| N2) ⊕ Kx_i, where N2 is a random nonce. 
2) Tagx →R: M1, M2    R→S: M1, M2, 1N  
          S: Search all (Knew, Kold, EPCx) and compute M2’= CRC(Knew||EPCx||N1||(M1⊕Knew))⊕Knew or 
M2’’=CRC (Kold ||EPCx||N1||(M1⊕Kold))⊕Kold. Verify the tag by checking whether M2’ or M2’’= M2.  
3) S→R: M3, DATA 
S: Depending on which value (Knew or Kold) satisfies the verification equation in the previous step, 
compute M3= CRC(EPCx||N2)⊕Pnew(or Pold) send M3, DATA to R. Update  Kold ←  Knew，Pold ←  
Pnew，Knew ←  PRNG(Knew⊕N2), Pnew ←  PRNG(Pnew⊕N2). 
4) R→  Tagx: M3 
Verify S by checking whether M3⊕  Px_i = CRC(EPCx|| N2) holds. If succeeds, update Kx_i+1 
←PRNG(Kx_i⊕N2)，Px_i+1←PRNG(Px_i⊕N2).  
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3.2 Security Analysis of the Improved Protocol 
We analyze Chien’s protocol and show that the protocol does not meet 8 security requirements. The 
following part shows the improved protocol basically meets the 8 properties. 
1) Tag Forgery Resistance: If a weak attacker intends to forge the tag, it must be able to pre-compute a 
valid response (M1, M2) to a reader query. However, it is infeasible to compute such a valid pair without 
knowledge of N2 and the case in Proposition 1 or Proposition 3 will not happen.  
2) Tag Anonymity: The location privacy of tag holders can be revealed when the tag’s answers are 
constant. Specifically, location privacy can be more significant when a certain tag is exposed to long-term 
tracking. It is therefore crucial to make all the information sent by the tag anonymous. As we have seen, 
in the mutual-authentication stage, the tag generates a nonce, by which all the transmitted messages are 
encrypted. In addition, the attack like that in Proposition 2 can not succeed without the nonce. Thus, Tag 
Anonymity is guaranteed and privacy location of the tag owner is not compromised. 
3) Forward Security: Forward security is the property that guarantees the security of messages sent in 
this session will be valid in the next session. Since key updating is fulfilled after the mutual authentication, 
and the attacker can not obtain Kx_i or Px_i by using the method in Proposition 4, a security breach of an 
RFID tag will not reveal data previously transmitted. 
4) Resist to DOS attack: If the fourth flow doesn’t reach the tag, the shared secrets of the server and 
tag might be out of synchronization, because the server will update the shared secrets while the tag will 
not. However, in the improved protocol, the server maintains both the old and new values of Kx_i and Px_i 
for Tagx  in its database, so the server can resynchronize with the tag in such situation. Additionally, 
although Server Forgery attack can also desynchronize the shared keys, the improved protocol can resist 
this attack  
5) Privacy: EPC code must be kept secure to guarantee user privacy. The messages M2 and M3 which 
can be eavesdropped by an attacker. However, EPC code is encrypted by a nonce N2 or Kx_i or Px_i, and an 
attacker will not obtain these three values which were discussed in Tag Forgery Resistance. Therefore, 
only authorized server and reader are able to access the information associated with the tag. 
6) Server Forgery Resist: Server Forgery Resist is usually used to protect the secrets synchronization 
between tag and server in the protocol. A legitimate server responds with a message M3 to a tag in order 
to enable the tag to authenticate the server. An attacker cannot create a valid M3 without knowing Px_i. 
Actually, Px_i is shared between Tagx and S and not yet exchanged in this (i+1)-th session. Additionally, 
it’s not revealed in the prior i times which has been discussed when analyzing Tag Forgery Resistance. 
Hence, our protocol resists such an attack. 
7) Data Confidentiality: A portion of the tag’s memory is rewritable, so modifications are possible. In 
this part of the memory, the tag stores the EPC code, authentication keyand access key. If an attacker does 
succeed in modifying this part of the memory, the reader will never authenticate the tag. Except physical 
attacks, Server Forgery attack will result in such modification by illegally updating Kx_i and Px_i. However, 
the improved protocol can resist this attack shown in 6).  
8) Backward Security: The improved scheme provides Backward Security if an attacker misses N2 just 
once in a single successful authentication session after compromising the tag’s secret. That is, if the 
attacker does not have access to the value of N2 once which is needed to update Kx_i and Px_i, he cannot 
compute the new keys and know future transactions. 
From analysis above, we find the improved protocol basically meets the 8 properties. Next, we show 
that the improved protocol also satisfies the other 3 requirements.  
9) Resist to Reply attack: An eavesdropper could store all the messages exchanged between reader and 
tag. Then a reader may be impersonated which may cause loss of synchronization between sever and tag 
or spoof the system, However, this is not the case due to the challenge-response technology and the 
freshness of  N1 and N2 per session. 
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10) Data Recovery: The interception or blocking of messages is a DoS attack which prevents tag 
identification. When dismissing messages, S can still recover the message thanks to the storage of Kold  
and  Pold in its database. 
11) Mutual Authentication: In the improved protocol, server identifies tag by verifying Kx_i in M1 and 
M2 , and tag authenticates server by verifying Px_i  in  M3. 
From the analysis above, we can see that the improved protocol basically meets all the 11 requirements 
in TABLE I where the security properties are summed up from [7-9]. The detailed necessity of these 11 
security properties has already been analyzed above. 
To solve the security problem, many schemes have been proposed[7-13]. However, they did not well 
fulfill the 11 security requirements shown in TABLE I. From the comparison with other recent Gen2 
based schemes in TABLE I, we can see the improved protocol has the most security properties and 
basically meets all the 11 security requirements. 
Table I. Security Properties of Existing Protocols  
Properties Chien[7] Pedro[8] Kart[9] Chen[10] Cai[11] Choi[12] Sun[13] Ours 
⑴Privacy × O O O O O O O 
⑵Anonymity × O O O O × O O 
⑶Resist to reply attack O O × × O O × O 
⑷Resist to DOS attack ▽ × × O O O O ▽ 
⑸Forward Security × O O × × × O O 
⑹Backward Security × × × × × × × ▽ 
⑺Data Confidentiality × O × O O O O O 
⑻Mutual Authentication O O O O O O O O 
⑼Tag Forgery Resist × O O O × O O O 
⑽Server Forgery Resist × O O O O × × O 
⑾Data Recovery O × × O O O O O 
Notation: ×: not provided;  O: provided;  ▽:partially provided               
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we analyze Chien’s protocol and find four new attacks that not discussed in prior 
literatures, and then present an improved version which still uses CRC and PRNG. The improved 
protocol basically meets all the 11 security requirements and may be the first protocol that basically meets 
these security requirements in Gen2 based schemes. However, the back-end server still needs exhausted 
search to authenticate a tag. It would be one of research topics to design secure Gen2 based protocol with 
little computation load. 
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